How Does Democracisation Affect Development?
The process of democratisation is complex. Many countries evolved gradually and rapidly during their history. Others inherited British democratic institutions from foreign interventions or colonialism. Japan and Germany, for example, became democratic after World War II. There is no single path to democracy. Rather, countries develop democracy over time through gradual accumulation of democratic institutions and practices. But how can we measure the process? Here are some guidelines. We can use the following model to measure the progress of democratisation.
To measure democratisation, we should study the process as an entire political system, from the institutions and processes that produce a state to the political processes that bring about democratic changes. Despite the fact that we do not have definitive answers, we can still measure its effects in terms of the quality of development. For example, if a country is developing slowly, its citizens must exert pressure on the ruling elite to make it more democratic. Moreover, it may be possible to measure the impact of democratisation on development if the regime is non-developmental, which makes it hard to equate democracy with good governance.
Tanzania’s 1990s experience shows the effects of authoritarianism. Its first president, Julius Nyerere, advocated bottom-up democratisation and democracy. However, his subsequent Ujamaa regime imposed top-down socialism and destroyed local democracy, forcing millions of farmers into communal communities. As a result, Tanzanians have lost confidence in their state’s ability to promote development and still favor elites.
Some scholars argue that democratic transformations may not only have detrimental effects on development, but that they might also lead to instability and chaos. Development in a democracy is best achieved in developed nations with high literacy rates, a strong middle class, and relative equality. Developing nations that democratise from below struggle against internal conflicts and interest-driven politics. And top-down solutions are riskier than bottom-up ones. In many developing countries, there is a high likelihood of failure unless political leaders can work out a balance between rulers and ruled.
Bottom-up democratisation involves reinforcing civil society, holding local leaders to account, and engaging the entire nation in development. Tanzania’s limited examples of bottom-up democratisation are encouraging, as Lange (2008) highlights the benefits of local rights to traditional grazing lands. Locals asserted their rights against unresponsive local leaders, gaining legitimacy from below and above. Eventually, these measures led to improved access to vital lands for pastoralists.
The second wave of democratisation was observed in Latin America and southern Europe. These countries posed a challenge to the conventional wisdom that authoritarian regimes were resilient. Democratisation theorists studied the processes that characterize these processes. A third wave of democratisation was observed in some countries where a democratic regime had reached unprecedented levels. However, this wave of democratisation was not expected. This suggests that democratisation is possible in countries with authoritarian regimes.
In addition, the process of democratisation in Africa was marked by the spread of democracy and its deepening. However, many countries still experience recurring periods of civil unrest and political instability. As a result, they have not achieved sustainable conflict resolution. This paper draws on economic ideas regarding institutions and contracts to explain the role of constitutional rules in political stability. Hence, it identifies self-sustaining constitutional rules as a prerequisite for a sustainable democracy and an end to violent civil conflict.
The process of democratisation is complex. Many countries evolved gradually and rapidly during their history. Others inherited British democratic institutions from foreign interventions or colonialism. Japan and Germany, for example, became democratic after World War II. There is no single path to democracy. Rather, countries develop democracy over time through gradual accumulation of democratic institutions and practices. But how can we measure the process? Here are some guidelines. We can use the following model to measure the progress of democratisation. To measure democratisation, we should study the process as an entire political system, from the institutions and processes that produce a state to the political processes that bring about democratic changes. Despite the fact that we do not have definitive answers, we can still measure its effects in terms of the quality of development. For example, if a country is developing slowly, its citizens must exert pressure on the ruling elite to make it more democratic. Moreover, it may be possible to measure the impact of democratisation on development if the regime is non-developmental, which makes it hard to equate democracy with good governance. Tanzania’s 1990s experience shows the effects of authoritarianism. Its first president, Julius Nyerere, advocated bottom-up democratisation and democracy. However, his subsequent Ujamaa regime imposed top-down socialism and destroyed local democracy, forcing millions of farmers into communal communities. As a result, Tanzanians have lost confidence in their state’s ability to promote development and still favor elites. Some scholars argue that democratic transformations may not only have detrimental effects on development, but that they might also lead to instability and chaos. Development in a democracy is best achieved in developed nations with high literacy rates, a strong middle class, and relative equality. Developing nations that democratise from below struggle against internal conflicts and interest-driven politics. And top-down solutions are riskier than bottom-up ones. In many developing countries, there is a high likelihood of failure unless political leaders can work out a balance between rulers and ruled. Bottom-up democratisation involves reinforcing civil society, holding local leaders to account, and engaging the entire nation in development. Tanzania’s limited examples of bottom-up democratisation are encouraging, as Lange (2008) highlights the benefits of local rights to traditional grazing lands. Locals asserted their rights against unresponsive local leaders, gaining legitimacy from below and above. Eventually, these measures led to improved access to vital lands for pastoralists. The second wave of democratisation was observed in Latin America and southern Europe. These countries posed a challenge to the conventional wisdom that authoritarian regimes were resilient. Democratisation theorists studied the processes that characterize these processes. A third wave of democratisation was observed in some countries where a democratic regime had reached unprecedented levels. However, this wave of democratisation was not expected. This suggests that democratisation is possible in countries with authoritarian regimes. In addition, the process of democratisation in Africa was marked by the spread of democracy and its deepening. However, many countries still experience recurring periods of civil unrest and political instability. As a result, they have not achieved sustainable conflict resolution. This paper draws on economic ideas regarding institutions and contracts to explain the role of constitutional rules in political stability. Hence, it identifies self-sustaining constitutional rules as a prerequisite for a sustainable democracy and an end to violent civil conflict.